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WHEN THEORY MET PRACTICE:  
DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
IN CRITICAL CRIMINAL LAW THEORIZING 
Aya Gruber* 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern critical race theorists, at least in the legal realm, often find 
themselves torn between two venerable, but inconsistent, traditions.  On the 
one side is the critical legal studies paradigm, which incorporates an acute 
skepticism of law, legal formalism, and rights constructs and instead seeks 
to expose the deep structures (institutional, discursive, and social) of racial 
and other hierarchies.1  On the other side is the civil rights framework, 
which views racial justice through a lens of equal rights and the legal 
frameworks erected to achieve them.2  The tensions between formalism and 
anti-formalism, individualism and structuralism, and liberalism and 
socialism manifest frequently in critical race theorizing.3  For example, 
while critical race theory embraces identity-based rights frames, when such 
frames prove constraining to substantive racial justice, theorists are eager to 
open up the notion of identity to intersectional and identity performance 
analyses.4  The same tensions play out more openly in feminist legal theory, 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School.  I would like to thank Mario 
Barnes, Paul Butler, Ming Chen, Amy Cohen, Paul Gowder, Jennifer Hendricks, Marcus 
Hunter, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, and Ahmed White for their helpful input. Special 
gratitude is due to Kimani Paul-Emile for inviting me to collaborate in this important 
symposium entitled Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods Conference held at 
Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the symposium, see Kimani Paul-
Emile, Foreword:  Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods Conference, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2953 (2015). 
 
 1. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  AN 
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2012) (setting forth basic principles of critical race theory); DUNCAN 
KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1975) (seminal critical legal 
studies text); infra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
 2. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to e-17 (2012).  Some would say 
that such work is actually “civil rights scholarship.” See John O. Calmore, Critical Race 
Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music:  Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a 
Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2164 (1992) (discussing this distinction). 3. See 
Jerome M. Culp Jr. et al., Subject Unrest, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2435, 2443 (2003). 
 3. See Jerome M. Culp Jr. et al., Subject Unrest, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2435, 2443 (2003). 
 4. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 701–29 (2001); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex:  A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, 
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140–42. 
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where liberal feminism battles non-liberal feminisms, like cultural and 
dominance feminism, over which camp has adequately captured the grand 
narrative of women’s oppression.5  When considering the topic of this 
symposium—how to incorporate empirical methodology into critical race 
theory—one must bear in mind that critical race theory, itself, is 
ideologically contested.  Before resolving how empiricism might fit into the 
critical race project, one must engage the issue of the fundamental nature of 
critical race methodology itself.  If the project is solely a liberal one, 
empiricists should devote efforts to generating data useful in the context of 
civil rights actions.  If the project is a critical one, empiricists should 
concentrate on demonstrating that the civil rights regime has failed to 
produce substantive justice. 
Focusing on criminal law and procedure in particular, this Article seeks 
to expose various tensions in critical race theorizing and progressive 
theorizing more broadly, offer some suggestions for a unifying 
methodology of critical criminal law analysis, and discuss where empirical 
study might fit into this new program.  Progressive (critical race and 
feminist) theorizing on criminal law is not only subject to the competing 
frames of critique and formalism, it also exists within an overarching 
American criminal law culture that can eclipse both concerns over rights 
violations and structural injustice.  The U.S penal system has become a 
“peculiar institution” and a defining governance structure of the American 
state.6  It boasts specific features, such as being driven by spectacular 
publicized criminal acts, its massive size, its strong racial skew, and its 
unrelenting political popularity.7  Criminal law theorizing in the United 
States is also peculiar.  Much of criminal law discourse, it seems, is subject 
to a type of ideological capture in which it is natural and typical to assume 
that criminalization is a valid, if not preferred, solution to social 
dysfunction.8  Thus, while there are a diversity of theories about just 
criminal liability and punishment, most U.S. criminal legal scholarship is 
about identifying what is and is not a wrong and proposing ways to address 
those wrongs through punitive measures. 
 
 5. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance:  On Sex 
Discrimination, in CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:  DISCOURSES ON 
LIFE AND LAW 32–33 (1987); see also Aya Gruber, Neofeminism, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1325, 
1331–44 (2013). 
 6. “Peculiar institution” is a term developed to describe the uniqueness of the American 
institution of slavery.  In recent times, the term has been appropriated to describe other 
aspects of U.S. law and politics such as racial segregation, prison, and the death penalty. See 
DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION:  AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF 
ABOLITION (2010); KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION:  SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-
BELLUM SOUTH (1956); Loïc Wacquant, The New ‘Peculiar Institution’:  On the Prison As 
Surrogate Ghetto, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 377 (2000). 
 7. See Aya Gruber, Duncan Kennedy’s Third Globalization, Criminal Law and the 
Spectacle, 3 COMP. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2012) (describing reasoning by spectacle as a new form 
of legal consciousness); infra notes 22–32 and accompanying text (discussing the peculiar 
features of the U.S. criminal system). 
 8. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:  CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 167–93 (2001) (noting the ways in which late twentieth–century 
punitivity is an embedded culture). 
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Owing to the clash of liberal and critical modes of reasoning and the fact 
that currently criminalization is the technique of addressing harm, 
progressive criminal law theorizing manifests some deep internal tensions.9  
On the one hand, critical race and feminist scholars are by and large vocal 
critics of the American penal state.  The critique primarily comes in the 
form of observations about the authoritarian criminal justice apparatus’s 
punitive, masculinist nature and disproportionate effects on minority men.10  
On the other hand, much of left-leaning criminal law scholarship involves 
identifying various crimes against minorities and women (domestic 
violence, rape, hate crimes, etc.), exposing the lackluster police and 
prosecutorial responses to such crimes, and calling for reforms targeted 
toward increasing arrests, prosecutions, convictions, and sentence 
severity.11  Thus, left-leaning legal scholars are in the contradictory position 
of regarding the U.S. criminal system as cruel, sexist, racist, and unfair, but 
investing more power in that very system in the hope of reducing crime 
against minorities.  Moreover, progressive investment in punitive authority 
may create more than just philosophical tension.  Liberal faith in the 
criminal apparatus as a solution to the problems of racial and gender 
subordination may serve to legitimize our status quo criminal system, 
strengthen the discourse of individualism that prevents greater institutional 
change, and distribute scholarly capital away from emphasizing the 
structural nature of racial and gender oppression.12 
I use this Article as an opportunity to endorse a “distributional” method 
of doing progressive criminal law scholarship that can ease the apparent 
tension between progressives’ laudable desire to address crimes against 
minorities and their deep concern with the U.S. penal state.  Distributional 
analysis is a term from critical legal studies, third-world approaches to 
international law (TWAIL), and governance feminism literature.  It 
involves meticulous and deliberate contemplation of the many interests 
affected by the existing criminal law regime and evidence-informed 
predictions about how law reform might redistribute harms and benefits, not 
just imminently but over time.13  This methodology, if widely adopted, 
would effect a profound change in criminal law theorizing.  Currently, 
much of progressive criminal law scholarship is devoted to exposing that 
 
 9. See generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME:  HOW THE WAR ON 
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007). 
 10. See Mari J. Matsuda, Crime and Affirmative Action, 1 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 309, 
319 (1998) (“[T]he criminal justice system is a primary location of racist, sexist, 
homophobic, and class-based oppression in this country.”); infra notes 22–32. 
 11. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 30–32. 
 12. See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 
618–26 (2009); Dean Spade, Their Laws Will Never Make Us Safer, in AGAINST EQUALITY:  
PRISONS WILL NOT PROTECT YOU 4–9 (Ryan Conrad ed. 2012). 
 13. See, e.g., Jorge L. Esquirol, Legal Latin Americanism, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. 
L.J. 145 (2013); Janet Halley, Introduction, in GOVERNANCE FEMINISM:  AN INTRODUCTION 
(Janet Halley ed., forthcoming 2015) (on file with author); Ileana M. Porras, European 
Origins, the Doctrine of the Providential Function of Commerce, and International Law’s 
Embrace of Economic Growth, 107 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 374, 375 n.5 (2013) 
(discussing TWAIL and distributional analysis). 
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race- and gender-based crimes occur and may even be a “crisis.” It then 
proposes generalized ratchet-up reforms to criminal to reduce such crimes 
or send a message that such crimes matter.14  Often these claims are not 
accompanied by evidence that criminalization is an effective method for 
reducing majority-on-minority crime or by a thorough analysis of the 
attendant high social and economic costs of increasing policing and 
punishment.15  Thus, upon reflection and more careful investigation, it may 
turn out that such generalized law reforms do not have the intended 
empirical effects and their intended messages may be lost in translation.  
Pumped up criminal regimes often serve to punish not the untouchable 
majority defendant but the minorities ensnared in their webs.  Punitive 
reform may actually harm the marginalized groups it is intended to serve.16  
Criminalization often casts crimes against minorities as the sole products of 
deviant racist and sexist individuals rather than as products of the social 
structure in which these individuals operate.17 
Distributional analysis calls for a deeper inquiry into the detection, 
definition, and description of social problems.  More importantly, it requires 
a very meticulous economics-style evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
punitive law reform proposals, which ideally brings in all interests relevant 
to critical theorists (group, individual, philosophical, political, 
socioeconomic) within a broadened temporal frame.18  Careful empiricism 
can help critical criminal theorists identify appropriate sites of scholarly and 
political activity, with an understanding of the variety of ways in which 
minorities experience harm and the heterodoxy or homogeneity of such 
experiences.  Thoughtful empirics also can aid in understanding the link 
between law reform and harm reduction—the demographics of the 
individuals affected by law reform, how parties involved see their interests, 
the links between the crime at issue and larger social structures, and the list 
goes on.  However, critical scholars must be careful not to lionize data as 
objective or untouchable and to retain awareness that scientific knowledge 
is necessarily produced within the context of value-driven choices.19  It is 
people, not data, who tell us something is a crisis, a state of affairs is unjust, 
 
 14. See Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
(describing this phenomenon). 
 15. See generally Ronald Weitzer, Sex Trafficking and the Sex Industry:  The Need for 
Evidence-Based Theory and Legislation, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1337 (2011). 
 16. See infra note 41. 
 17. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 183 
(2000) (asserting that crime control discourse on domestic violence eclipsed critiques of 
patriarchy and women’s structural inequality); Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2195, 2202–03 (2000) (noting that criminal law presumes immunity for “those who 
create an ideological system that makes rape possible”). 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS:  THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN 
SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995); Sheila Jasanoff, The Practices of Objectivity in Regulatory 
Science, in SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING 307–37 (Charles Camic et al. eds., 2011); 
Susanne Krasmann, Law’s Knowledge:  On the Susceptibility and Resistance of Legal 
Practices to Security Matters, 16 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 379, 386–87 (2012); Sally 
Engle Merry, Measuring the World:  Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52 
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY (SUPP. 3) S83, S85 (2011). 
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or groups are suffering.  The best we can do as critics and scholars is to try 
in earnest to get a lay of the land with deliberate consciousness of the 
dominant normative frames that shape methodological choices.20  
Distributional analysis thus calls on critical empirical scholars to retain 
skepticism of objectivity, be aware that design choices and data labeling are 
value laden, and be mindful of critical race, feminist, and other anti-
subordination concerns when collecting and presenting data.21 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I discusses the 
phenomenon of “critical criminalization,” that is, when progressive criminal 
law scholars support harsher criminal laws and greater law enforcement in 
an effort to aid minorities and to vindicate anti-subordination values.  It also 
posits that criminalization regimes rarely stem from distributional analyses, 
but rather from scholars’ sincere desire to expose and publicize harms to 
minorities coupled with the assumption that criminalization is an 
appropriate response to harm.  Part II asserts that this phenomenon 
demonstrates that progressives can come under the influence of a “punitive 
impulse” that causes people, when faced with spectacular harm, to hastily 
and uncritically accept criminal law and formalist penal theory.  Part II also 
exposes the exceptional areas in which progressives have resisted this 
impulse.  Part III describes distributional analysis and explains how the 
method counters the punitive impulse, carefully catalogues the larger effects 
of legal reform, and appropriately relies on empirical work to help establish 
a factual picture.  In doing so, Part III sounds a cautionary note that 
empirical evidence can be more harmful than helpful if it is utilized 
uncritically, seen as res ipsa loquitur, and aggrandized as objective truth. 
I.   CRITICAL CRIMINALIZATION 
Critical race scholars, when looking at the U.S. criminal justice system in 
the abstract, uniformly agree that there are too many criminal laws, arrests, 
and individuals under penal supervision.22  Progressive scholars also hold 
that the system is sexist, racist, elitist, socioeconomically skewed, and 
unnecessarily sadistic.23  Critical race theorists have been on the forefront 
of critiquing the American penal state for its discriminatory nature, whether 
it is publicizing statistics demonstrating that African Americans bear the 
 
 20. See Tor Krever, Quantifying Law:  Legal Indicator Projects and the Reproduction of 
Neoliberal Common Sense, 34 THIRD WORLD Q. 131 (2013). 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See, e.g., Marie Gottschalk, The Long Reach of the Carceral State:  The Politics of 
Crime, Mass Imprisonment, and Penal Reform in the United States and Abroad, 34 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 439, 450−51 (2009) (noting that “U.S. penal practices are way out of line with 
those of other Western countries”); sources cited infra notes 22–31. 
 23. PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE:  A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 23–40 (2008) 
(problematizing mass incarceration); infra note 27; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal 
Republic:  Democratic Breakdown As a Cause of Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
133, 133 (2011) (observing that “mass incarceration” describes the “explosion of Americans’ 
reliance on imprisonment”). 
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brunt of the public’s lust for punishment,24 contextualizing modern 
racialized policing as part of the “Southern strategy,”25 uncovering 
unconscious bias in arrest and prosecution,26 or reporting instances of 
outrageous invidious discrimination.27  Feminists and queer theorists have 
critiqued the penal system for being a repository of hypermasculinity that 
generates exaggerated gender performances.28  Liberal political theorists 
tend to regard the state’s ability to inflict pain and suffering on its citizenry 
as a necessary evil that must be strictly monitored for proportionality and 
whose costs must be subject to constant scrutiny.29 
Today, some of the most compelling critiques of the U.S. criminal 
system come from political economists and Marxists.  Theorists have 
increasingly viewed criminalization and tough-on-crime rhetoric as an 
integral part of the United States’ late twentieth century economic and 
political shift toward neoliberalism.  Neoliberalism is described as “a 
political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and 
to restore the power of economic elites” by reconceptualizing individualism 
and capitalism as moral imperatives and denigrating distributive justice as 
encouraging moral failure.30  War-on-crime rhetoric, punitive policies, and 
political grandstanding on crime were indispensable parts of this political 
and economic reconfiguration.  Depictions of monstrous offenders and 
opportunistic minority criminals appealed to and reified public sentiment 
that dysfunction and harm are problems of individual pathology rather than 
social structure.  The war on crime and drugs allowed a conservative 
government that had disavowed the state’s role in solving social problems 
to be seen as “doing something” about the country’s most pressing 
problems.31  Moreover, as Marxist political theorists have noted, the United 
States’ augmented penal authority provided a politically appealing 
alternative to welfare for managing the denizens of surplus labor, 
particularly minority labor, in an era of increasing automation and 
 
 24. Jacqueline Johnson, Mass Incarceration:  A Contemporary Mechanism of 
Racialization in the United States, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 301, 302–04 (2012). 
 25. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
 26. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
2035 (2011). 
 27. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in 
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1298–99 (2004). 
 28. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”:  Masculinities Studies, Terry 
Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671 (2009) (discussing policing and 
hypermasculinity); Matsuda, supra note 10, at 319 (calling the criminal justice system “a 
primary location of racist, sexist, homophobic, and class-based oppression in this country”). 
 29. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (Batoche Books 2000) (1789) (asserting that the “evil” of punishment must be 
outweighed by its benefits); see also Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, reprinted 
in KANT:  POLITICAL WRITINGS 131, 155 (H.B. Nisbet trans., Hans Reiss ed., 2d ed. 1991) 
(calling for proportionality); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in THEORIES OF ETHICS 
144, 145–48 (Philippa Foot ed., 1967) (noting “all that can be said against” punishment). 
 30. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 19 (2005); see also Gruber, 
supra note 12, at 618–19. 
 31. See Gruber, supra note 12, at 652; see also BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF 
FREE MARKETS:  PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 202–03 (2011). 
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migration to overseas and alternate labor markets.32  In short, one would be 
hard pressed to find a progressive legal scholar with a kind word to say 
about prosecution within the current American penal state.  That is, until it 
comes to crimes against minorities. 
When faced with spectacular violence against minorities—especially 
violence that reflects and reinforces inequality—progressives, and 
particularly feminists, are quick to endorse state intervention in the form of 
increased policing, prosecution, and incarceration, and typically condemn 
discriminatory leniency.33  Discriminatory leniency describes the 
phenomenon whereby defendants, especially white defendants, offend 
against minorities and women and receive unduly lenient treatment under 
the law.34  For example, in an effort to express appropriate condemnation of 
George Zimmerman and ensure that Trayvon Martin’s death was not in 
vain, racial justice seekers advocated strengthening Florida murder law by 
eliminating the stand-your-ground doctrine and narrowing self-defense.35  
Similarly, many commentators consider domestic violence, rape, and 
provocation law reform that increased the policing, prosecution, and 
incarceration of men who commit violence against women to be one of the 
great, if not the greatest success, of the modern feminist movement.36  The 
reformation of laws governing gender violence continues to be an enduring 
site of feminist theorizing and lawmaking.37  Critical scholars lament that 
 
 32. See, e.g., Loïc Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration:  Rethinking the 
“Race Question” in the US, 13 NEW LEFT REV. 41 (2002); Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, 
Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 759 (2005). 
 33. See supra notes 31–32. 
 34. See Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 COLO. L. REV. 129, 132–
34 (2014) [hereinafter Gruber, Minority] (discussing “discriminatory leniency”); Aya 
Gruber, Race to Incarcerate:  Punitive Instinct and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your Ground, 68 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 961 (2014) [hereinafter Gruber, Race to Incarcerate]. 
 35. See Press Release, NAACP, NAACP Responds to Texas A&M Study Showing 
Danger of Stand Your Ground Laws (June 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.naacp.org/press/entry/naacp-responds-to-texas-am-study-showing-danger-of-
stand-your-ground-laws (quoting NAACP President Ben Jealous as stating, “‘stand-your-
ground’ legislation does more harm than good”); Sean Lengell, Black Caucus Members 
Offer Resolution to Honor Trayvon Martin, WASH. TIMES INSIDE POL. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2012, 
6:46 PM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside-politics/2012/apr/4/black-caucus-
members-offer-resolution-honor-trayvo (noting the congressional black caucus’s call for the 
law’s repeal); cf. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Reacts to Murder Charge Against George 
Zimmerman in Trayvon Martin Shooting (Apr. 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/aclu-reacts-murder-charge-against-george-zimmerman-
trayvon-martin-shooting (discussing ACLU support for the outside investigation that led to 
Zimmerman’s arrest). See generally Gruber, Minority, supra note 34 (cataloging such 
responses). 
 36. See Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan’s Law, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 267, 
302 (2006) (observing the “perceived success of feminist rape law”); Renée Römkens, 
Symposium, Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking:  Author Meets Readers, Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, Christine Harrington, Sally Engle Merry, Renée Römkens, & Marianne Wesson, 
10 J.L. & POL’Y 313, 337 (2002) (noting that “the feminist social movement [may] be 
remembered for its influence on criminal law”). 
 37. For example, there currently appears to be sustained public fascination with the 
“crisis” of sexual assault on U.S. college campuses. See e.g., Breaking the Silence, 
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/breakingthesilence/ (last visited 
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feminists have allowed pro-prosecution reforms to trump distributive, 
economic, and culture-based efforts to combat gender violence and that 
criminalization essentially “took over” the feminist antiviolence 
movement.38 
In the context of domestic violence reform, it is possible that feminists 
did engage in a critical distributive analysis of prosecutorial policies, 
weighing the benefits to women against the drawbacks of criminalization, 
but perhaps miscalculated the balance.  Because white women are virtually 
immune from the reach of the punitive state, feminists may have assumed 
that bolstering criminal law would be a relatively cost-free experiment.39  
Increased prosecutorial power would distribute in a way as to affect only 
men—abusive empowered men—leaving women free of any of the harmful 
residue of increased state penal authority.  This assumption, that criminal 
authority is a friend to women, has been derided by critical race feminists 
who are acutely aware that the American criminal system’s bias toward 
women does not necessarily extend to women of color.40  Moreover, studies 
on domestic violence criminal law reform paint an ambivalent picture of 
benefits to women’s safety, economic security, and social standing and 
indicate that reform does not just burden socially empowered abusive 
men.41  Strikingly, Dr. Lawrence Sherman, the lead investigator of the 
 
Apr. 23, 2015) (Huffington Post’s web portal on campus sexual assault news); see also infra 
notes 113–21 and accompanying text. 
 38. See Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to “Straighten Out” Criminal 
Law:  What Might Happen When Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal Law’s 
Conventional Responses to Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 81, 93 
(2003) (asserting that criminal law “essentially took over anti-domestic violence efforts”); G. 
Kristian Miccio, A House Divided:  Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the 
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 290 (2005) 
(noting that states channel domestic-violence funds nearly exclusively to law enforcement, 
leaving inadequate resources for other services to abuse survivors). 
 39. See Amy Farrell et al., Intersections of Gender and Race in Federal Sentencing:  
Examining Court Contexts and the Effects of Representative Court Authorities, 14 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 85, 85–86 (2010) (“[L]eniency toward women has become an almost accepted 
phenomenon among scholars studying criminal case processing.”). 
 40. Cord Jefferson, Professors Concerned About Boom in Black Female Incarceration, 
BET (Mar. 17, 2011, 10:03 AM), http://www.bet.com/news/national/professors-concerned-
about-boom-in-black-female-incarceration.html (noting that black women are the fastest 
growing prison population and that black women are eight times more likely to go to prison 
than white women). 
 41. Studies reveal that mandatory arrest statutes resulted in marked increases in 
domestic violence arrests of women, sometimes greater than the increase in male arrests. See 
Carol Bohmer et al., Domestic Violence Law Reforms:  Reactions from the Trenches, 29 J. 
SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 71, 78 (2002) (citing Ohio study finding that mandatory arrest law 
raised female arrest rates far more than male arrest rates); David Hirschel et al., Domestic 
Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws:  To What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest 
Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255, 259 (2007) (citing studies).  Recent 
empirical work further evidences that mandatory arrest of the man may actually harm the 
woman. See Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather M. Harris, Increased Death Rates of 
Domestic Violence Victims from Arresting Vs. Warning Suspects in the Milwaukee Domestic 
Violence Experiment (MilDVE), 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2015);  see also 
Radha Iyengar, Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic Violence?  Evidence from 
Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 13,186, 2007) (finding that mandatory arrest laws increase intimate partner homicides). 
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famous Milwaukee and Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiments in the 
1980s and 1990s, which sparked the widespread adoption of mandatory 
arrest laws, conducted a follow-up study in 2012 and 2013 of the long-term 
effects of domestic violence arrest on the Milwaukee victims.42  Dr. 
Sherman found that arrests actually produced negative outcomes: 
After 23 years, our follow up study found that victims whose partners had 
been arrested were 64% more likely to have died than those whose 
partners had NOT been arrested.  These deaths were from natural causes, 
not violence.  For African-American victims, the rate of such death was 
almost 100% higher for those whose partners had been arrested.  For 
victims who had jobs, the death rate was 300% higher if their partner had 
been arrested.  Because most states have laws that require police to make 
arrests for domestic violence, they prevent police from testing what may 
be better ideas.43 
An alternative explanation of progressives’ intermittent embrace of 
criminalization is that their analyses do not extend beyond the recognition 
of a gender- or race-based harm and the assumption that criminal law is 
appropriate.  It is true that a number of the domestic violence reformer 
pioneers are extremely circumspect about the costs of the criminalization to 
individuals, society, and the feminist project.44  Although early activists 
regarded intimate partner violence as a widespread problem that both 
reflected and reinforced women’s subordination, many hesitated to fully 
embrace state criminal intervention and counseled caution.45  Nevertheless, 
today’s domestic violence reform advocacy is often inattentive to the 
broader effects of increased criminalization on women victims in particular, 
gender equality, and the anti-subordination agenda writ large.46  Indeed, 
progressive scholars frequently jump from the identification of a race- or 
gender-based harm or social problem to a proposal about how to strengthen 
the state’s criminal response without really contemplating whether lack of 
criminal law played a significant (or any) causal role in the harm, whether 
more criminal law will reduce (or increase) the harm, and whether any 
reduction in such harm will outweigh the secondary costs of the 
criminalization. 
This explanation seems particularly applicable to the stand-your-ground 
debate.  Unlike white feminists who may not see expanding the penal state 
 
 42. See Sherman & Harris, supra note 41. 
 43. Interview by Matthew Pryce with Dr. Lawrence Sherman, University of Cambridge, 
WAMC NORTHEAST PUB. RADIO (May 1, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://wamc.org/post/dr-
lawrence-sherman-university-cambridge-domestic-violence-and-arrests; see also Sherman & 
Harris, supra note 41. 
 44. See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741 (2007); see also, 
e.g., Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law:  A 
Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 806–07 (2001); Holly Maguigan, Wading into 
Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle Ground” Between Acceptance and Rejection of 
Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
427, 443–44 (2003). 
 45. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 182–88 (discussing the dilemmas presented by 
mandatory arrest policies). 
 46. See Gruber, supra note 44 at 791. 
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as bad for women because of white women’s relative immunity from 
policing and prosecution, scholars of color are fairly united in the view that 
the policing and prosecution in the current U.S. penal system is at odds with 
racial equality and anti-subordination.47  Despite race scholars’ jaundiced 
view of criminal justice, they did not respond to the Zimmerman case 
primarily by encouraging scrutiny and reform of racially biased 
neighborhood watch practices.  They did not prioritize investigating 
Sanford’s police department and D.A.’s office to determine whether they 
had engaged in a pattern or practice of race-based discretionary decisions.  
They did not seek to revise Florida’s antiquated six-person jury system, 
which long has been criticized for silencing minority voices.48  Rather, 
reformers quickly and loudly called for the unequivocal repeal of Florida’s 
stand-your-ground law, thereby generally narrowing self-defense and 
enhancing the state’s ability to arrest, prosecute, and punish individuals for 
murder.49  However, in the rush to repeal stand-your-ground, few reformers 
acknowledged—or seemed to recognize—that such a legal change would 
grant more authority to the very police and prosecutors they criticized for 
exercising their existing authority in a racist manner. 
Feminist and race scholars often prescribe generally applicable criminal 
reforms with the apparent assumption that such laws will affect only or 
primarily people with the attributes of the horrific, privileged defendants 
who provoke liberals’ ire.  However, rules of general applicability apply to 
populations, not persons, and any prediction about the distribution of their 
effects must be the product of deliberate study and contemplation.  For 
example, in the George Zimmerman case, racial justice advocates appeared 
to believe that stand-your-ground’s utility to Zimmerman evidenced its 
inherently racist nature, such that eliminating it, narrowing self-defense, and 
pumping up murder law would primarily serve to burden whites-who-kill-
blacks.50  Yet, beyond Zimmerman, who seemed likely to benefit from the 
 
 47. See id. at 796–98. 
 48. See, e.g., Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District 
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Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 897 (1998). 
 49. See Gruber, Race to Incarcerate, supra note 34, at 973–78 (discussing progressive 
commentators’ responses to the Zimmerman case). 
 50. See, e.g., Sarah Childress, Is There Racial Bias in “Stand Your Ground” Laws?, 
PBS FRONTLINE (July 31, 2012, 12:40 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
criminal-justice/is-there-racial-bias-in-stand-your-ground-laws/; Trymaine Lee, Minister:  
Latest Teen Murder Shows Stand Your Ground ‘Reeks of Racism,’ MSNBC (Nov. 29, 2012, 
10:35 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/minister-latest-teen-murder-shows-stand-your 
(discussing white gun collector’s shooting of an unarmed black teenager); Sean Sullivan, 
Four Reasons Why ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws Won’t Be Repealed, WASH. POST (July 19, 
2013, 10:11 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/07/19/four-
reasons-why-stand-your-ground-laws-wont-be-repealed/. 
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doctrine,51 and some other anecdotal examples, critics did not have any 
evidence that white racists—and not other types of defendants—are the 
primary beneficiaries of the doctrine.52  In fact, critics called to repeal the 
doctrine and study it at the same time.53 
Once the empirical evidence began trickling in, it materialized that the 
overall racial picture of stand-your-ground is quite complicated and the 
doctrine does not necessarily exacerbate the deep racial—and especially 
gender—disparities in self-defense success rates.54  In fact, stand-your-
ground may have some strange racial equalizing effect.55  One should not 
be surprised at this finding.  Racial bias is not inherent in the stand-your-
ground or self-defense law―it is a function of discriminatory application 
by state actors and jurors exercising discretion.  Repealing stand-your-
ground makes it more difficult for those who did not retreat to have a 
defense, but it otherwise leaves intact police discretion to arrest or decline 
arrest, prosecutorial discretion to charge, and juror discretion to find or not 
find self-defense.56  The racial problems in the Zimmerman case stemmed 
from Zimmerman’s profiling of Martin, the police’s incredible faith in 
Zimmerman’s (a murder suspect’s) self-serving claims, the prosecutor’s 
refusal to acknowledge that Zimmerman had racially profiled Martin, and 
the jury’s apparent identification with “George’s” distrust and fear of the 
young black Martin.57  Eliminating stand-your-ground leaves all these 
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U.S. Commission on Civil Rights intends to determine whether “SYG statutes by their 
nature . . . create opportunities for racial bias to enter into the system”); Gruber, Race to 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/us/zimmerman-trial.html. 
 57. See Gruber, Race to Incarcerate, supra note 34, at 994–95. 
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conditions fully intact and allows state actors and jurors to continue to 
apply the self-defense doctrine in an unfair manner, just with more severe 
consequences to the defendants, likely minority defendants, who draw their 
punitive gaze. 
A similar story plays out with the feminist position on the provocation 
defense.  Provocation mitigates murder to manslaughter when a defendant 
has been adequately provoked into a state of passion.58  Feminists critique 
the doctrine for giving cover to male intimate homicide defendants who 
assert that some benign behavior on the part of the female victim—wanting 
a divorce, leaving, dancing with another, et cetera—impassioned them to 
kill.  Feminist scholars have publicized the horrific and spectacular facts of 
individual cases to demonstrate that gender justice requires the abolishing 
or generally narrowing of the defense.59  Reformers believe that such 
changes will have the primary effect of ensuring that atrocious femicidaires 
receive the most severe sentences under U.S. law.60  However, the only 
empirical study of provocation cases found that such men are generally 
unsuccessful at pleading provocation and those who are successful tend to 
be vulnerable people who killed their tormentors.61  Moreover, given the 
demographics of murder defendants generally, “the group most likely to be 
burdened by the elimination or limitation of the provocation defense is 
young men of color accused of non-intimate homicides and facing murder 
charges in one of the most punitive systems on earth.”62 
II.   THE PUNITIVE IMPULSE AND ITS RESISTORS 
Why do progressives, particularly feminists, upon diagnosing the 
problem of violence against minorities and women, often eschew all the 
global critiques of criminalization and endorse criminalization within the 
current penal structure as a solution of first resort?  Why has the issue of 
individual violence become the primary target of feminist inquiry and 
reprobation and at least an important component of antiracist discourse?  I 
have argued that a “punitive impulse” can lead even those who, as a 
philosophical matter, question state authority, and as a practical matter, 
critique the actual operation of the U.S. penal system, to ignore these 
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dispositions and embrace punitivity for whatever they consider true harm.63  
This process of jumping from identifying a harm to a prosecutorial solution 
often happens unconsciously or at least without serious deliberation.  The 
punitive impulse results from a sustained national eidos that has for decades 
accepted criminal law as a legitimate, if not the preferred, response to harms 
attributable to bad individuals: 
The punitive impulse stems from a distinct punitive ideology that 
embraces a particular set of normative commitments, empirical 
assumptions, and a specific view of the role of government.  For decades, 
criminal law and policy in the United States has conceived of criminal 
offenders as dangerous, abnormal actors, who are the unique cause of 
social disorder, retributively deserve harsh punishment, and need to be 
totally incapacitated in order to prevent recidivism and deter others from 
committing crime.  The ideology of crime as a disease of inequality and 
social breakdown to be prevented through ex-ante social programs or 
addressed with ex-post treatment seems as passé as the zoot suits that 
were en vogue at the same time as the ideology.  It is thus difficult to 
imagine a paradigm under which criminal punishment is a measure of last 
resort to be used exceedingly sparingly.64 
Although, progressives reject the tough-on-crime philosophy that created 
our American-style penality, being on the left hardly makes a person 
immune from the long-standing and culturally embedded messages about 
perpetrators, victims, and punishment.  As one scholar notes, even for the 
skeptical “it is difficult to shake the paradigm that the criminal law is the 
natural response to a social problem.”65 
The punitive impulse, in addition to inducing selective amnesia about the 
general progressive position on the penal state, also appears to lead some 
progressive scholars to embrace very formalist and absolutist positions that 
are generally anathema to critical theorists.  When it comes to racialized 
and gendered violence, formal equality quickly trumps anti-subordination, 
as progressives call for equal prosecution in the otherwise denigrated 
criminal law.  For example, race-conscious commentators asserted that 
Zimmerman should have received the same type of treatment that Martin 
would have received had he been the shooter.66  In doing so, they seem to 
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ignore that if Martin had wrested the gun and shot Zimmerman, 
progressives would want police restraint, prosecutorial caution, and a robust 
self-defense law.  Feminists also take up the mantle of equality, even 
though they cannot credibly argue that male offenders receive greater 
leniency than similarly situated female defendants.  The American criminal 
system is notoriously biased toward white women offenders who frequently 
receive lower sentences than their male counterparts—a bias that does not 
seem to offend most feminists’ senses of formal equality.67  Instead, 
feminists argue that gender crime should be treated “like any other 
crime.”68  Yet, reformers have advocated for and achieved a domestic 
violence system that institutes exceptional procedural rules, treats gender 
violence as sui generis, and expresses special zero-tolerance, all in the name 
of equal treatment.69 
Progressive advocates of criminalization also justify punitive change on 
the formalist grounds of retributivism and expressivism.70  They assert that 
racist killers and femicidaires in some objective sense “deserve” the highest 
charge (first-degree murder) and attendant punishment (life without parole 
or death) available under U.S. criminal law and that only such charges and 
punishments express appropriate condemnation.71  However, retributivism 
necessarily justifies state infliction of pain solely with reference to a priori 
decontextualized conceptions of culpability.  Feminist and other critical 
theorizing long has held that acontextual and “objective” legal principles 
like retributivism reflect, obscure, and entrench social, economic, and racial 
hierarchies.72  To be sure, progressive scholars critique retributivism for 
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reifying race and social marginality as culpability73 and have traced how 
retributive rhetoric undergirded late twentieth century tough-on-crime 
ideology and the consequent incarceration explosion.74  Social scientists 
also have discovered that people’s conception of culpability is inherently 
raced.75  Theorists also critique the notion that punishment is justified 
because it “expresses” anticrime messages.  Bernard Harcourt, for example, 
points out:  “Punishment usually also communicates, importantly, political, 
cultural, racial and ideological messages.  The meaning of punishment is 
not so coherent or simple. Many contemporary policing and punitive 
practices, for instance, communicate a racial and political, rather than 
moral, message—a message about who is in control and about who gets 
controlled.”76 
The punitive impulse, in addition to explaining why progressives 
prioritize criminal responses to harm, helps illuminate the choice to focus 
on individual acts of violence against minorities rather than more global 
sources of harm.  Today, leftist critical race and environmental scholars 
discuss the concepts of “slow violence” and the “slow death” of 
marginalized populations caused by conditions of poverty, environmental 
degradation, public and private violence, and low social status.77  These 
critiques, however, are all but absent from popular discussion and do not 
appeal to a public conditioned to understand questions of justice and equity 
through the lens of spectacular instances of individual wrongdoing.  As a 
strategic matter, condemning what deviant hate-crime killers or abusive 
men do secures public and political support.  For this reason, feminist 
efforts to end sex trafficking, severely punish rape, and express zero-
tolerance for domestic violence have resulted in some strange bedfellows 
like legal risk management teams, the Christian right, and John Ashcroft.78  
However, “strategies become institutions,” and feminists’ tactical choices 
within the neoliberal criminal state are now simply part of feminism.79 
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The relentless focus on individualist harm, embrace of punitive policies, 
sublimation of racial and other general critiques of the penal state, and use 
of formalist constructs demonstrate that progressive criminal law 
scholarship is subject to the ideological capture that has influenced a vast 
amount of criminal law theorizing over the past several decades.  
Nevertheless, there are areas of progressive criminal law scholarship that 
seem to resist the punitive impulse to remedy discriminatory leniency with 
greater carceral severity.  Indeed, many feminist and racial scholars dissent 
from their colleagues’ view that the best way to address bias crimes, rape, 
domestic violence, and the like is through expansion of the criminal 
system.80  Here, however, I am talking about discrete areas where 
progressive scholars somewhat agree that the identification of horrific 
crimes against minorities and even discovery of disparate leniency toward 
those who offend against minorities does not necessitate a punitive 
response. 
One of the most common examples of racism in criminal law involves 
the administration of capital punishment.  Death penalty scholars publicize 
evidence that those who offend against black victims are less prone to 
receive capital punishment than those who offend against white victims, 
especially African Americans who offend against white victims.81  But 
critical commentators do not then call for measures to ensure that those who 
kill blacks receive the death penalty in equal proportion to those who kill 
whites.82  Racial capital punishment critics do not publicize the horrific 
details of murders involving black victims and then assert that the killers 
retributively deserve death.83  Rather, progressives have always 
characterized the victim-based racial bias in death penalty as grounds for 
further skepticism of the government’s ability to manage the immense penal 
power of the death penalty.  Thus the fact that the capital punishment 
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system is lenient toward crimes against minorities is not grounds to make it 
more severe; rather, it is grounds to abolish it.84 
In this case, progressive scholars are able to resist the punitive impulse, 
even when faced with brutally violent crimes against minorities, because 
they take an institutional and distributional view of pro-prosecution reform 
within the context of the current U.S. penal state.  Progressive scholars 
“look at capital punishment institutionally—its philosophical groundings, 
its larger effects on subordinated groups and communities, and its place 
within an evolved global civilization.”85  When seen in an institutional 
light, the racial disparity is just one more reason to question the entire 
practice.  At least one race-conscious theorist, Randall Kennedy, has 
suggested that the racial disparity could be remedied through applying 
capital punishment more frequently to those who murder African 
Americans, recognizing an attendant cost of increasing death sentences for 
black defendants.86  In response, progressive scholars have been fairly 
united in the view that Kennedy’s position does not adequately account for 
the other racial, philosophical, and practical drawbacks of expanding capital 
punishment administration.87 
In a somewhat similar vein, queer theorists do not universally view 
crimes against LGBT persons, even those motivated by bias, to be grounds 
to reform criminal law and procedure to give more advantages to 
prosecutors.  While fully condemning bias crimes and “gay panic,” such 
scholars remain circumspect about the ability of criminal law to serve as a 
vehicle of gender liberation.  Dean Spade articulates the position: 
Increasingly, queer and trans people are asked to measure our citizenship 
status on whether hate crime legislation that includes sexual orientation 
and gender identity exists in the jurisdictions in which we live. . . .  The 
idea that we are in danger rings true, and the message that law 
enforcement will deliver safety is appealing in the face of fear.  The 
problem is that these promises are false, and are grounded in some key 
myths and lies about violence and criminal punishment.88 
Spade further notes, “Many queer and trans people are increasingly critical 
of criminalization and immigration enforcement, and are unsatisfied by the 
 
 84. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
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(one that provides heightened protection against murder ‘for whites only’) and no death 
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Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)). 
 85. Gruber, Minority, supra note 34, at 134–35; see also Harry Blackmun, The Supreme 
Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 45–46 (1994); Claire Finkelstein, A 
Contractarian Argument Against the Death Penalty, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2006). 
 86. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp:  Race, Capital Punishment, and the 
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1392–94, 1438 (1988). 
 87. See Gruber, Minority, supra note 34, at 169; see also, e.g., David Cole, The Paradox 
of Race and Crime:  A Comment on Randall Kennedy’s “Politics of Distinction,” 83 GEO. 
L.J. 2547 (1995). 
 88. Spade, supra note 12, at 3. 
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idea that the answer to the violence we experience is harsher criminal laws 
or more police.”89 
Death penalty scholars and queer theorists are certainly not intimating 
that crimes against racial and gender minorities are not a problem or just a 
negligible problem.  They do not even take the position that amplified 
criminal law never produces improved outcomes.  Rather, they critically 
examine the larger distributional effects and institutional meanings of 
punitive reform and conclude that the benefits of punishing some sexist, 
racist, and homophobic offenders is outweighed by the risk that the 
criminalization will actually affect marginalized people, the costs of 
legitimating late modern American penal philosophy, and the diversion of 
academic capital away from economic and cultural efforts.90  These types 
of analyses, I assert, are necessary to counter the very deeply entrenched 
punitive impulse that leads people, upon viewing harm that moves them, to 
advocate criminalization for its own sake. 
III.   DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF DATA 
Having made the case that a deeply entrenched punitive impulse exists 
and is manifest in progressive scholarship, this part seeks to refine a 
methodology for resisting it.  Accordingly, it describes distributional 
analysis, explains how empirical work fits into the methodology, and 
advances a cautionary note about the limits of scientific objectivity and 
empirical knowledge.  As indicated in the introduction, distributional 
analysis is not a novel concept, and critical theorists have been employing it 
for decades.91  Critical legal theorists sometimes describe the enterprise as 
looking beyond legal rhetoric and formalism to identify the “winners and 
losers” of a given legal regime.92  Law and economics adherents might call 
it cost-benefit or efficiency analysis, although most legal economists’ very 
limited concept of what counts as a benefit or cost, which ignores social 
costs and wealth relativity, make their analyses more obfuscating than 
enlightening in terms of identifying actual interests.93 
The most current and deliberate description of distributional 
methodology comes from recent literature on governance feminism.94  Left 
legal scholars coined the phrase governance feminism to describe the 
phenomenon of feminism’s powerful influence on various governance 
structures—local and national governments, bureaucracies, intrastate 
 
 89. Id. at 7–8. 
 90. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 91. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 92. See Esquirol, supra note 13, at 162. 
 93. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 118–21 (1987) 
(discussing the ideology of law and economics). 
 94. See Halley, supra note 13 (manuscript at 61–71); see also Janet Halley et al., From 
the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, 
and Sex Trafficking:  Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 335, 405–06 (2006).  For an example of excellent scholarship that employs 
distributional analysis, see Prabha Kotiswaran, Born unto Brothels—Toward a Legal 
Ethnography of Sex Work in an Indian Red-Light Area, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 579 (2008). 
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organizations, legal systems, social norms, etc.  The scholarship illustrates 
and critically examines how feminists have come to “walk the halls of 
power” and govern.95  Let me stop there, as this is not an essay about 
governance feminism.96   The governance feminism literature’s framework 
for distributional analysis is helpful in understanding the methodological 
proposal here.  Janet Halley, a seminal voice in this literature, describes 
distributional methodology as follows: 
You can do a distributional analysis in your mind while walking towards 
an important meeting or with allies via a highly abbreviated email huddle; 
you can make it the form and substance of a long book.  Basically, you 
are trying to identify the consequences of a change you could introduce in 
the status quo, and to decide whether they are “worth it.”97 
In Halley’s description, distributional analysis has three primary 
directives:  (1) separate “is” from “ought,” (2) identify the surplus, and 
(3) imagine it otherwise.98  Discussing these directives in turn, the first idea 
is that those who seek to intervene in a legal regime should, at the outset, 
attempt to gain a full, fair, and deep understanding of what is going on 
before passing on the morality of the legal regime.  This reflects the legal 
realist insight that any credible analysis of the law requires one to look 
beyond what a law says or aspires to do and understand what the law 
actually does.99  It also incorporates the notion that scholars should not 
approach legal analysis from a morally retrospective position.  Drawing on 
Llewelyn, Halley asserts that theorists should not first decide on some 
utopian vision of a legal order and, in this frame of mind, decide whether 
the existing arrangement is desirable.100  This stands in stark distinction to 
the prevailing method of justifying criminal law intervention―through 
penal theory.  Many proponents of retributivism believe that the penal 
theorists’ sole purpose is to identify wrongs in some abstract, perhaps 
arbitrary or political, sense and prescribe punishment, regardless of the 
political, social, and legal environment in which the punishment takes place 
or even the nature of the punishment itself.101  Similarly, expressivists 
 
 95. Halley, supra note 13 (manuscript at 3). 
 96. In fact much of this Article is subject to Halley’s critique of fetishizing state 
authority.  See id. (manuscript at 5–7). 
 97. Id. (manuscript at 61). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. (manuscript at 62) (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 
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of legal realism on distributional analysis). 
 100. See Halley, supra note 13 (manuscript at 62) (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Some 
Realism About Realism:  Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931)). 
 101. See Gruber, supra note 70, at 452–55 (noting retributivism’s arbitrariness).  After 
reading some of my scholarship on provocation law, which endorses distributional analysis, 
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identify one possible meaning of a law—that it does or does not 
appropriately condemn crime—and that is the end of the critical inquiry.102 
Much of the current progressive criminal law scholarship also takes a 
morally retrospective position and assumes that reform proposals will 
somehow avoid the realities of criminal law administration and take place 
in a utopian world.  A striking example of this is feminists’ proposals to 
abolish the provocation defense.  Reformers recognize the potential that 
removing mitigation from the law would likely result in more first-degree 
murder convictions and therefore more life without parole and death 
sentences—sentences feminists generally disfavor.103  Upon recognition of 
this wrinkle, some have retreated from the anti-provocation position, at 
least in death penalty jurisdictions.104  Other reformers, however, continue 
to support provocation abolition/limitation proposals and claim that larger 
sentencing consequences are simply “a different issue.”105  Instead of 
comparing the status quo with what is actually possible, provocation critics 
measure current provocation law against a reformed murder law that exists 
in a hypothetical legal system with a radically less punitive sentencing 
structure.  Similarly, in the Zimmerman case, those critiquing stand-your-
ground appear to assume that the alternative to the status quo consists of a 
world in which the newly expanded murder law will be applied by fair-
minded antiracist state officials and not result in greater application of the 
death penalty.106 
The “is-ought” distinction then naturally flows to the next directive of 
distributional analysis—identifying the surplus.  Identifying only instances 
of suffering in the status quo gives a very limited and perhaps deceptive 
view of what is going on.  It also has a very right-leaning political bent.  
The selective exploitation of spectacular instances of brutality has been a 
deliberate and important part of the conservative strategy to push through 
pro-penal, antiwelfare reform.107  Instead, critical criminal law scholars also 
should investigate the benefits of the status quo, even to those generally 
identified as crime victims.  For example, some progressive scholars are 
breaking from the feminist tradition of cataloging and counting women’s 
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experiences of violence and instead are asking women who experience 
violence to explain the things they value, the things they need, the obstacles 
they face, et cetera.108  Of course, it is an impossible task to examine all of 
the benefits and harms to all of the players in a given criminal law 
controversy, much less than determine what counts as a harm and a benefit 
in a world where the same act can be a harm or benefit, depending on the 
context or who you ask.  Nevertheless, criminal scholarship often proceeds 
as if it has fully interrogated the justice of the status quo legal arrangement, 
when in fact it has set out to describe and publicize a pre-determined harm.  
Halley explains, “Getting the frame right enough is part of the challenge.  
One thing that does not make sense, ever, is to frame in only the losers.  
Who are they losing to?  What are they losing?  Why were they in the game 
in the first place?”109 
These two components of distributional analysis speak directly to the 
question posed in this symposium:  How does one meld critical theory and 
empirics?  It should be evident that finding out what is going on and 
identifying winners and losers calls for empirical study of the world, not 
just scholarly exegesis of the law.110  However, empirical study set within a 
methodology that confuses “ought” with “is” or only focuses on harm, 
undermines rather than furthers the critical mission.  Progressive and 
feminist criminal law commentators often set out to prove that a certain 
spectacular harm, likely publicized by the media, is serious and 
widespread—“an epidemic”—as a precursor to suggesting 
criminalization.111  Experts then design studies, gather evidence, and 
interpret information within this framework.  Scientific studies, unlike 
anecdotal illustration or argument, come with an added danger—they bear 
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the imprimatur of objectivity.112  Thus, while scholars and laypersons alike 
can write off theory and postulation as merely contingent arbitrary opinion, 
data is the “objective truth,” when in fact it is often ideology masquerading 
as objectivity. 
An example of this phenomenon is the proliferation of campus climate 
surveys of sex, designed in the wake of a publicized rape “crisis” and 
“epidemic” and a vocal critique that existing studies undercount rape and 
discourage reporting.113  The federal government has advised universities to 
model climate surveys on the 2007 National Institute of Justice Campus 
Sexual Assault Study114 (CSA) and asserts that surveys should not simply 
ask whether the respondent has been raped.  The claim is that this 
methodology will inexorably understate the sexual assault problem because 
people do not like the rape label and have differing definitions of rape.115  
However, the government does not instead endorse asking the respondent 
what actually happened during the sexual encounter—how many drinks, 
what was said or done, where it took place, how did you feel, et cetera—
and letting that information speak for itself.  Instead, the directive is that 
surveys query whether the person has had “unwanted” sexual contact “that 
involved force or threats of force” or that occurred “while you were unable 
to provide consent or stop what was happening.”116  It further defines force 
to include “someone holding you down with his or her body weight [or] 
pinning your arms” and specifies that inability to consent or resist could 
include “times that you voluntarily consumed alcohol or drugs.”117  Thus, a 
person who felt subtle pressure, was fairly unenthusiastic, and was on the 
bottom during sex, but did not communicate unwillingness, could answer 
“yes” to the forcible sexual assault question.  Likewise, a person who 
engaged in ambivalent or later-regretted sex while voluntarily intoxicated 
could answer “yes” to the incapacitated sexual assault question. 
The CSA and government directive, in an apparent effort to prevent 
undercounting, create a “collapsed continuum” in which a unenthusiastic 
sex in the missionary position is in the same category as rape at gunpoint.118  
It also puts drunken unsatisfying sex in the same category as being raped 
during rufie-induced unconsciousness.  This broad counting methodology 
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(and perhaps not “false consciousness”) goes far in explaining the fact that, 
in the CSA, the most frequent answer to the question of why students fail to 
report “rape” is I “did not think it was serious enough to report.”119  
Nevertheless, pursuant to the counting methodology, the media headlines 
and White House talking points blare that “one in five female college 
students are raped.”120  This statistical “indicator” is then the beginning and 
the end of the conversation on whether greater punitivity is warranted.121  
Sally Engle Merry theorizes the pattern: 
As forms of knowledge, indicators rely on the magic of numbers and the 
appearance of certainty and objectivity that they convey.  A key 
dimension of the power of indicators is their capacity to convert 
complicated contextually variable phenomena into unambiguous, clear, 
and impersonal measures.  They represent a technology of producing 
readily accessible and standardized forms of knowledge. . . .  Labeling is 
essential to produce a measure that is readily understood by the public and 
simple in its conception.  Labels do not necessarily accurately reflect the 
data that produce the indicators, however.  How indicators are named and 
who decides what they represent are fundamental to the way an indicator 
produces knowledge.122 
When it comes to indicators and labeling that involve criminal harm—harm 
that can be attributed to individuals’ behavior—the power of data combined 
with the punitive impulse necessarily lead people to embrace 
criminalization reforms.  Aziza Ahmed observes: 
[T]he production of a vast amount of knowledge on violence against 
women [(“VAW”)]:  on sexual violence, sex trafficking, gender crimes, 
and domestic violence amongst others. . . . crystallizes a new 
commonsense about the way to approach women’s rights:  through 
criminal law and even through war.  The heavily contested feminist 
terrain of how to actually address VAW gives way to one strand of 
feminism coded in expert and data driven knowledge about VAW and 
justifies the punitive response.123 
It is evident that empirical analysis has a very large role to play in 
distributive methodology’s call on progressive scholars to scrupulously map 
out the terrain of interests in any given legal controversy.  A critical 
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empiricist, however, must be careful to attempt to avoid the pitfalls 
described by Halley, Merry, and Ahmed.  Moreover, empiricists should 
bear in mind that the indicators and labels they produce transform the very 
environment on which they comment.  In the criminal law context, the 
publicizing of outrageous harms has the potential to create a cultural need 
for retribution and a widespread feeling of insecurity.  Thus, if 
criminalization does not occur, people suffer because these needs and 
feelings go unaddressed. 
In the Zimmerman case, the broad dissemination of the claim (and 
empirical “support”) that stand-your-ground provides a virtual license to 
“shoot-away” and is primarily utilized by racist whites to shoot blacks, 
significantly changed the equities of retaining the provision.124  First, the 
cultural meaning of stand-your-ground began to eclipse the legal meaning, 
making the law more permissive than it otherwise would have been.125  
Second, it produced a feeling in many African Americans that the doctrine’s 
continued existence signified their definitive subordination.126  Thus, before 
the Zimmerman case, the analysis might have involved determining 
whether, on balance, minorities (aggregating defendants and victims) 
benefit or suffer from stand-your-ground, and arguing for retention if 
minorities generally benefit.  Today, the analysis is different, such that even 
if minorities technically gain advantage under the doctrine, any such benefit 
has to be weighed against the cost of retaining a symbol of racism. 
A similar scenario plays out with campus sexual assault, where university 
officials now educate freshmen that rape is likely, that anyone can commit 
it, and that it can happen anywhere.127  Strikingly, when asked what she 
learned during freshman (White House–approved) sexual assault 
orientation, one student replied, “[i]t’s infuriating because no one is 
safe.”128  And, despite the fact that the Rolling Stone article reporting a 
fraternity gang-rape at University of Virginia rapidly unraveled, a female 
freshman nonetheless reported that “[w]e’re scared to go out now, even in 
groups.”129  Accordingly, female students feel that punitive campus 
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disciplinary reform is necessary to protect them and value women.130  
Distributive analysis of whether to ratchet-up discipline now must factor 
into the potential for aggravating or allaying college women’s (perhaps 
false) sense of insecurity.131  Consequently, when engaging in critical 
empirical analysis, scholars must keep in mind that their work does not only 
reflect existing distributions, it has the power to produce new distributions, 
new cultures, and new meanings.  As Justice Jackson said about legal 
decisions, empirical observations also can lie about like loaded weapons.132  
Recognizing the epistemological power of this information can aid the 
critical empiricist in determining what to study, how to study it, and how 
and whether to release results.  If the scholar believes that releasing the 
information will, within the current political, social, and cultural milieu, 
inevitably or likely lead to the adoption of policies with maldistributive 
effects, the scholar has the option of holding the information, publicizing 
but a part of it, or trying to counter such an effect through careful labeling. 
This brings us to the third component of distributive analysis:  imagining 
it otherwise.  Once a critical scholar feels that she has mapped out the 
various interests in a legal regime in a satisfactory matter, she then can 
bring in normative judgments regarding what is wrong and right about the 
distribution and how legal intervention might tick the advantages and 
disadvantages in one way or another.133  Unlike a utilitarian who might see 
all interests as morally equal, feminists and race scholars’ analyses rightly 
evidence particular normative commitments, such as anti-subordination, 
distributive justice, and substantive equality.134  Thus, for the critic, the 
interests of majority actors, men and whites, in maintaining a monopoly on 
social status and economic power are not coextensive with minorities’ 
interests in freedom from subordination and substantive justice.135  
Accordingly, a progressive scholar can perform distributive analysis while 
maintaining a commitment to women’s and minority empowerment.136  
However, determining what is good for women, good for African 
Americans, et cetera, is a very complicated endeavor.  Instead of working in 
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the mainstream feminist mode and assuming that every tick against male 
power is a tick in favor of female empowerment, distributional analysis 
forces us to see how the ticks actually work and confront the fact that 
“[s]ome women are the mothers, daughters, or sisters of men facing 
retributive justice, even as some women are the victims of male violence; 
some women are the victims of other women’s violence.”137 
When assessing whether a given change in the status quo is good from a 
feminist or critical race perspective, distributive methodology calls for the 
examination, not just of the ways in which the interests of men and women 
or whites and blacks conflict, but also the complex ways in which they 
converge.  Thus, for example, a battered woman’s interests in being free 
from violence conflicts with an abuser’s interests in continued battering.  
Nevertheless, the parties might have convergent interests in shelter and 
economic security as members of a socioeconomically marginalized group.  
They may have convergent interests in freedom from police overreach, as 
racial minorities.  They may have convergent interests in stemming the tide 
of anti-immigrant fervor, as immigrants.  They may have convergent 
interests in maintaining the relationship.138  Yet domestic violence law, in 
an attempt to provide men with disincentives to commit violence, makes it 
easier to deny Section 8 housing, augments police arrest authority, adds 
grounds for deportation, and imposes de facto divorce.139  This may be a 
tick in favor of the woman in an area of conflict—or not, if the punitive 
model actually leads to greater violence—but it is certainly a tick against 
her in several areas of convergence. 
Finally, scholars should ground their analyses in the recognition that 
these seemingly individual conflicts and convergences take place within a 
larger structural reality.  There is a structural reality as to why abusers batter 
and victims stay in the relationship.  There is a structural reality as to why 
police deploy to certain neighborhoods, why they profile, and why they 
resist top-down reform.140  There is a structural reality as to why 
undergraduates flock to parties at a certain fraternity house, even knowing 
that everyone calls it the “rapey frat.”141  Changes to the legal status quo 
not only affect individual distributions, they also reinforce or undermine 
structures.  For criminal law theorists, any criminalization proposal 
necessarily occurs in the shadow of a particularly problematic time in the 
history of the American penitentiary.  Consequently, proposals that treat 
criminal law as the natural remedy to social problems, even those in the 
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name of anti-subordination, risk reinforcing an anti-distributive, highly 
subordinating neoliberal political structure, not to mention legitimizing the 
carceral state.142  Again, this does not mean that a criminal law proposal 
can never be the path toward gender and racial liberation.  Nevertheless, the 
realization that criminal law has built-in distributional costs will likely 
mean that, in the vast majority of scenarios, criminalization becomes a 
technique of last, not first, resort. 
CONCLUSION 
The methodology proposed here is certainly more cumbersome and 
perhaps less psychically rewarding than beating the drum about extreme 
injustice and pushing forward extensive criminal law reform.  As lawyers, 
scholars, and people deeply committed to social justice, it is only natural 
that we want to expose subordination and oppression and seek its quick 
resolution.  However, the left’s forty-year flirtation with carceral 
feminism143 demonstrates that progressives need to do more than just 
expose individual crimes against minorities and women and call for 
criminal law responses.  Of course, some now grumble that the feminist 
movement is afflicted by “paralysis produced by the many internal critiques 
of feminism.”144  However, at this moment in which mass incarceration is a 
juggernaut, the criminal law books are filled to capacity, and newly 
publicized forms of harm herald rapid criminal lawmaking, perhaps a little 
paralysis on criminalization is not such a terrible thing. 
Distributional analysis is not a perfect analytic construct with no 
downsides and no transactional costs—not that any method is.  Critical race 
theorists may rightly worry that distributional analysis’s complex and 
normatively ambivalent mapping of interests might undercut the ability of 
critical scholarship to actually produce a better distribution.  To be sure, 
there is an emperor-has-no-clothes quality to the method.  Jorge Esquirol 
explains: 
It may be that systematically making societal decisions based on a 
perception of winners and losers . . . could have negative consequences 
for the very positions progressives favor.  Indeed, this realist/critical move 
may undermine the very legal constructs that could most directly advance 
progressive interests (whatever those may be on a given point).  This is 
the case because this analytic contributes to undermining the at-least 
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marginal confidence that is needed for law to operate as a viable social 
system.145 
What happens to a critical race theory that involves counting (and 
recognizing the value of) the interests of poor whites or working-class 
cops—groups that are often extremely racist?  Can scholarship have 
political heft without moral indignation, without asserting rights, without 
identifying perpetrators and victims?  My answer here is twofold.  First, I 
believe that progressive scholarship generally will benefit from shattering 
liberal dogma, digging deeper, and being open to critique, both external and 
internal.  And, lest we forget, “from a purely distributional perspective, 
some or all of law may be seen as pernicious, as it locks in certain earlier 
choices under the guise of ‘legal rights.’”146  Second, scholars always have 
the option to weigh the benefits and costs of transparency about their 
distributional mapping and decide not to be transparent and not to air “dirty 
laundry.”147  Esquirol calls this “the distributional analysis of doing 
distributional analysis.”148  If, after a careful distributional analysis a 
scholar believes that rhetoric of hellfire and damnation, or at the opposite 
end, silence, will best produce a beneficial state of affairs, then so long as 
the costs of such tactics are factored into the equation, the scholar can use 
them. 
A related concern may be that it is impossible to get the analysis “right.”  
It seems absolutely unworkable to map all the interests of every person 
within every structure, paying attention to overlapping and conflicting 
interests and structures.  Imagining it otherwise feels like it requires a 
crystal ball.  Indeed, distributional analysis necessarily lives in the 
interstices—it is contestable, in contest with itself, and messy.  However, 
once we realize that mapping interests and imagining it otherwise is what 
we already do, albeit for the most part instinctively and incompletely, the 
task seems a bit less daunting.149  There is no precise formula for how many 
interests is enough or how to accurately envision the ripples caused by a 
legal change.  In fact, getting the formula “right” is less important than just 
trying the method.  In our current era of punitivity, where substantive 
criminal theorizing has become peculiarly devoted to uncovering harms and 
instantly prescribing criminalization, progressive scholarship benefits from 
the mere attempt to account for multiple interests and self-consciousness 
regarding the frames in which the interests are charted.  Distributional 
analysis, I believe, represents a union of the empirical and normative, of the 
perspectival and scientific—a union that counters the punitive impulse and 
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helps move discussions of criminal law and policy away from the peculiar 
institution that is the American penal state. 
 
